Film distributors occasionally withhold movies from critics before their release. Cold openings provide a natural field setting to test models of limited strategic thinking. In a set of 856 widely released movies, cold opening produces a significant 15% increase in domestic box office revenue (though not in foreign markets and DVD sales), consistent with the hypothesis that some moviegoers do not infer low quality from cold opening. Structural parameter estimates indicate 1-2 steps of strategic thinking by moviegoers (comparable to experimental estimates). However, movie studios appear to think moviegoers are sophisticated since only 7% of movies are opened cold.
Introduction
The hypothesis that economic agents can correctly infer what other agents know from their actions is a central principle in analysis of games with information asymmetry. A contrasting view is that strategic thinking can be limited by cognitive constraints. In this view, players with private information can fool some of the people, some of the time, in contrast to the standard equilibrium assumption that nobody is fooled. 1 One model of limited strategic thinking assumes there is a 'cognitive hierarchy' (CH) of levels of steps of thinking. Low-level players do not think strategically, and higher-level players anticipate the behavior of lower-level players correctly. These models have been used to explain experimental data from a wide variety of normal-form games. 2 The many examples studied include both games in which behavior deviates systematically from equilibrium and others in which behavior is surprisingly close to equilibrium even without learning or other equilibrating forces (e.g., Östling et al. 2007 ). The only applications of these theories to games with private information so far are analyses of auctions. 3 Another class are models of 'cursed equilibrium' in which agents ignore the possible link between information and actions of other players to some degree (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) .
Models of limited strategic thinking are the most useful if the same basic principles can apply to many different games and to field data as well as experimental data. This paper explores the generality of these approaches through the first empirical comparison of the CH and cursed equilibrium model in privateinformation games using field data. 4 (Full rationality is also part of the comparison since it is a limiting case of the CH and cursed models.)
The setting is Hollywood. Movie distributors generally show movies to critics well in advance of the release (so that critics' reviews can be published or posted before the movie is shown, and can be quoted in newspaper ads). However, movies are sometimes deliberately made unavailable until after the initial release, a practice sometimes called "cold opening." If moviegoers believe that distributors know their movie's quality (and if some other simplifying assumptions hold), we show in the next section that rational moviegoers should infer that cold opened movies are below average in quality. Anticipating this inference, distributors
should only cold open the very worst movies. However, this conclusion requires many steps of iterated 1 See Crawford (2003) . 2 See Nagel (1995) , Stahl and Wilson (1995) , Camerer et al. (2004) , Crawford and Iriberri (2007a) . 3 See Crawford and Iriberri (2007b) and Wang (2006) . 4 Two unpublished studies using field data and cognitive hierarchy approaches areÖstling et al., (2007) using Swedish lottery choices and experimental analogues, and Goldfarb and Yang (2007) using estimation of firm adoption of 56K modems. TheÖstling et al. study compares QRE and cognitive hierarchy approaches but Goldfarb and Yang do not compare to QRE, and neither paper estimates the cursed equilibrium model as we do since both are modeled as complete information games.
reasoning (as well as many simplifying assumptions). So it is an empirical question whether the equilibrium prediction holds. If it does not hold perfectly, it is also an empirical question whether models of limited strategic thinking designed to explain experimental data can fit the distributors' cold opening decisions and the box office response.
This setting is one example of a much more general class of games in which a seller who knows something about a product's quality can choose whether to disclose a signal of its quality or not (see Verrecchia (2001, section 3) and Fishman and Hagerty (2003) for surveys). For instance, a car salesman can signal a vehicle's quality by adding a warranty (Grossman, 1981) . Online daters can decide whether to post a picture or not (Hitsch et al., 2006) . Restaurants can voluntarily post health department ratings when not required to by law (Jin and Leslie, 2003) . HMOs can choose whether to voluntarily disclose quality by submitting to independent accreditation (Jin, 2005) . A regulated firm can selectively report information about its industry to regulators (Milgrom, 1981) . A hedge fund can selectively report past earnings (Malkiel and Saha, 2005) .
In politics and law, the analogous situation is when one can choose to disclose the answer a direct question, or can avoid answering the question (e.g., "pleading the fifth" in legal settings).
For regulators, what consumers infer from non-disclosure is important for deciding whether disclosure should be voluntary or mandatory. If consumers do not infer that nondisclosure is usually bad news about quality, an economic argument can be made for mandatory disclosure under some conditions. We return to this topic in the conclusion, noting that our results are consistent with other findings that mandatory disclosure typically has a positive effect on quality.
Basic ideas
A fully rational analysis, due originally to Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) , implies cold opening should not be profitable if some simple assumptions are met. The argument can be illustrated numerically.
Suppose movie quality is uniformly distributed from 0 to 100, moviegoers and distributors agree on quality, and firm profits increase in quality. If distributors cold open movies with quality below a cutoff 50, moviegoers with rational expectations will infer that the expected quality of a cold opened movie is 25. But then it would pay to screen movies with qualities between 26 and 100, and only cold open movies with qualities 25 or below. Generally, if the distributors do not screen movies with qualities below q * , the consumers' conditional expectation if a movie if unscreened is q * /2, so it pays to screen movies with qualities q ∈ (q * /2, 100] rather than quality below q * . The logical conclusion of iterating this reasoning is that only the worst movies (quality 0) are unscreened. This conclusion is sometimes called "unravelling."
Whether there is complete unraveling, in theory, is sensitive to some of the simplifying assumptions (see Milgrom 2008) . If disclosure is costly (Viscusi, 1978; Jovanovic, 1982) , sellers will only reveal information down to a certain threshold of low quality. 5 In other cases, sellers may know the quality of their product with some probability (Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988; Shin, 1994; Dye and Sridhar, 1995; Shin, 2003) , or can only learn the quality at a cost (Matthews and Postlewaite, 1985; Farrell, 1986; Shavell, 1994) . Fishman and Hagerty (2003) assume a portion of consumers are unable to interpret revealed information, but this does not necessarily lead to limited disclosure. 6 These conditions which may prevent unravelling do not characterize the movie business particularly well. The median production budget in our sample is $35 million, the marketing budgets are often comparable in scale (50-100% of the production budget), but the costs of arranging screenings for critics (or now, sending DVD's) is on the scale of thousands of dollars. Furthermore, sellers usually know a lot about quality-as judged by likely moviegoers-because movies are almost always screened for test audiences, and learning about quality perceptions from these tests is not costly. Therefore, we proceed with the maintained hypothesis that complete unravelling should occur in theory, if distributors and consumers are perfectly rational.
What do models of limited strategic thinking predict? The cognitive hierarchy models proceed through the steps of strategic thinking in the rational unravelling argument, except that they assume that some fraction of moviegoers end their inference process after a small number of steps. For example, a level-0 moviegoer thinks that cold opening decisions are random (they convey no information about quality) and hence infers that the quality of a cold-opened movie is average. A level-1 distributor anticipates that moviegoers think this way and therefore opens all below-average movies cold, and shows all above-average movies to critics.
Higher-level thinkers simply iterate this process. Observed behavior will then be an average of the predicted behaviors at each of these levels weighted by the fraction of moviegoers and distributors who do various numbers of steps of thinking. (More details of this model are given in section 4.)
The model of cursed equilibrium is similar. It assumes that a fraction of moviegoers form the correct conditional expectation of quality given a cold opening (i.e., those moviegoers act as if they know precisely how distributors map quality into the decision about whether to cold open). The remaining fraction (mistakenly) believe that cold opened movies are random in quality, neglecting the link between distributors' information about quality and their cold opening choice (the same inference that the level-1 moviegoers make in the CH model). Note that full rationality is a special case of the model. Industry executives and analysts who describe the cold opening decision often imply that limited moviegoer rationality justifies a cold opening, because they say that a bad review can hurt more than a non-review does. For example, Greg Basser, CEO of Village Roadshow Entertainment Group, told us, "If you screen [a bad movie] for critics all they can do is say something which may prevent someone from going to the movie." As Dennis Rice, the former Disney publicity chief put it, "If we think screenings for the press will help open the movie, we'll do it. If we don't think it'll help... then it may make sense not to screen the movie." (Germain, 2006) . Litwak (1986) notes "As a courtesy, and to ensure that reviews are ready by the time a film is released, distributors arrange advance screenings for critics. However, if negative reviews are expected, the distributor may decide not to screen a picture, hoping to delay the bad news. (p. 241)"
The data we describe next show that about 7% of the movies in our sample are opened cold (though that fraction has increased sharply in recent years). Regressions show that cold opening appears to generate a box office premium (compared to similar-quality movies that are pre-reviewed, and including other controls), which is consistent with the hypothesis that some consumers are overestimating quality of movies that are opened cold.
We then fit two parametric models of limited strategic thinking to both moviegoer and distributor decisions. The models parameterize the degree of strategic thinking by one parameter, so we can characterize the degree of limited rationality numerically (and compare the results to experimental estimates). The bestfitting CH model parameters suggest that moviegoers are doing an average of 1.12 steps of thinking, which is lower but roughly comparable to estimates from experiments (1-2 steps). However, given the box office premium, distributors should be opening many more movies cold. Within the restrictive structure of the CH model, the only possible explanation is that distributors think moviegoers are quite sophisticated, so the distributors' estimated average number of thinking steps is around 8. The mismatch between the degree of strategic thinking of moviegoers and distributors is not typically observed in experimental data. However, keep in mind that experiments rarely use mixtures of populations which are more and less strategically sophisticated, so it is perhaps not surprising that the estimate of distributor strategic thinking is very high.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the data we use on quality ratings, box-office returns, and control variables, and presents some regression results on the existence and robustness of a boxoffice premium for movies that are opened cold. Sections 3 and 4 describe the CH and cursed equilibrium models (including "quantal response equilibrium" (QRE), which is a special case of the latter) and estimate 
Data
The data set contains all 890 movies widely released 7 in the U.S. in their first weekend, over the 6 1 2 year period from January 1, 2000 to June 30, 2006. 8 Critic and moviegoer ratings are used to measure quality. Metacritic.com ratings are used to measure critic ratings. Metacritic.com normalizes and averages ratings from over 30 movie critics from newspapers, magazines, and websites. The metacritic rating is available for all non-cold-opened movies on the day they are released and available on Monday for cold opened movies. In this way it is generally exogenous from box office revenue measures. 9 7 Attention is restricted to movies initially released in over 300 theaters. Movies in more limited release have much less box office impact (they are usually art house movies that use a platform strategy of starting on a few screens, then expanding). It is also likely that information about quality leaks out more rapidly for these movies if they later go into wide release, even when they are initially opened cold.
8 Movies before 2000 are excluded because Metacritic.com's records did not cover every movie from before 2000. 9 Ratings such as the imdb.com user rating are determined by the people who see the movie and who give reviews afterwards. We treat that variable as a measure of popularity, but consider it endogenous to box office. A natural question to ask is whether metacritic ratings accurately capture the quality of movies as perceived by moviegoers and revealed by demand. Our analysis indicates they do. Figure 1 indicates that metacritic ratings are correlated (.43) with the logarithm of total US box office revenue. This result is also found in studies of critic influence (Eliashberg and Shugan, 1997; Reinstein and Snyder, 2005) .
We also examine the aggregated user ratings on imdb.com, the largest internet site for user movie reviews. There is a high correlation (.76) between metacritic scores and imdb user reviews (see Figure 2) . The high correlation result is not specific to genre (see Table 3 below). Metacritic scores therefore correlate with two clear indicators of movie popularity (imdb and box office). 10 The squares in Figure 1 represent the cold opened movies in our sample. No cold opened movie has a metacritic rating higher than 55, and the average rating for those movies is 25. However, the graph does not conclusively show whether cold opened movies do better than non-cold-opened movies because there are 10 We are assuming that critic reviews influence moviegoers. Alternatively, critics might correlate with overall popularity (as our previous evidence suggests), but moviegoers ignore them so they have predictive, but influencing power. Survey evidence suggests one third of moviegoers use critical reviews to make decisions (Simmons, 1994) . But the empirical work of Eliashberg and Shugan (1997) finds it impossible to reach a definitive conclusion on this issue, and Reinstein and Snyder (2005) find evidence that critic ratings only matter for specific genres. However, the latter study only examines the effect of two critics (i.e., Siskel and Ebert) delaying their review. A cold opening delays all reviews and thus might have a greater effect across genres. Because this evidence is somewhat inconclusive, we will use several different tests to check our hypothesis that it is indeed the cold opening increasing box office and thus the critic reviews (or lack thereof) influencing moviegoers. other variables that are not included in Figure 1 which correlate with box office revenues (e.g., the initial number of screens on which the movie is shown).
Cold opening, box office revenues, movie genres and ratings, production budgets, and star power ratings are collected from various data sources (see Appendix A for a more detailed description). All these variables were used in a regression model to test if movies that are cold opened have significantly greater opening weekend and total US box office. Table 1 provides summary statistics for all variables.
Each movie, j, has a metacritic.com rating, q j , a dummy variable for whether a movie was cold opened, c j (=1 if cold), and a vector X j of other variables. The regression model is Table 2 shows the regression results.
The point of this initial regression is not to estimate a full model with endogenous distributor decisions;
that will be done in Sections 3 and 4. Instead, the regression is simply a way of determining whether there is a difference in the revenue between cold opened and screened movies. Under the standard equilibrium assumption that all quality information of cold opened movies is inferred by logical inference of moviegoers,
we should see no difference in revenues, and the cold coefficient should be zero. 11
The "cold" coefficient in the first row of Table 2 shows that cold opening a movie is positively correlated with the logarithm of opening weekend and total US box office (see Appendix B, Table A .1 for a similar result with opening day data). These coefficients suggest that cold opening a movie increases revenue about 15%. 12,13 These effects persist when the "lean" regressions are run with only the most significant variables included (i.e., cold, metacritic, theaters, budget, competition, star ranking, sequel or adaptation dummy, and year of release). The lean regressions show a more significant effect for opening weekend, compared to total box office, because critic reviews of cold opened movies are normally available by the Monday after the opening weekend. 14 The coefficients also suggest that cold opening increases movie revenue by roughly 11 Alternatively, a switching regression model (similar to Borjas, 1987) for the choice to cold opened could be used to capture the cold opening premium and characterize the decision to cold open. We have instead chosen to describe the industry through a quantal response model (see Section 4).
12 For the average gross of a cold opened movie, $20 million, this is roughly $3 million of box office revenue. 13 Although we would consider it a regression with endogeneity, these results do not change using imdb.com user ratings instead of metacritic ratings.
14 It is somewhat surprising that the effect of a cold opening continues after the first weekend when critical reviews are available. Intuitively, the cold opening effect should occur during the first weekend and then dissipate rapidly as moviegoers learn the true quality of a cold opened movie. An alternative explanation is that moviegoers infer quality from the first weekend's revenue (see De Vany and Walls (1996) for a model with such dynamics). Then the perceived "effect" of a cold opening on post-first-weekend box office includes a secondary result from cold opening affecting the first weekend's box office (as in models of herd behavior or cascades). The data agree with this assessment; if we run a regression on logged box office revenues after the first weekend (see Table A .2), including logged first weekend with our other independent variables, then we find cold has an slightly negative the same amount as the full regressions (14-17%).
The regression results in Table 2 are generally sensible. Higher quality leads to higher box office-an increase in one metacritic point increases revenues by 2.1%. An extra $10 million in production budget is correlated with a 3% increase in revenues. The number of theaters opened, which often indicate expectations about movie revenues, have a very large effect. 15 An increase of 1000 theaters increases movie revenue by 86%. The averaged logged star power rankings have a negative correlation (higher numbers indicate lower rankings and less revenue). Adaptations and sequels increase box office by roughly 13%, a result which may explain the recent growth in the fraction of movies in this category.
Alternative Explanations of the Cold Opening Premium
The central premise of this paper is that limited strategic thinking causes moviegoers to overvalue the quality of cold opened movies that are of below average quality, which is one possible explanation for why cold opened movies have a higher relative box office to similar movies that were screened for critics. The previous section finds evidence for that higher box office, but there may be other reasons for the observed premium.
This section explores such possibilities and reports evidence against most of these explanations.
One apparent alternative explanation is that not everyone knows whether movies have been cold opened (e.g., it may be costly to find out). Consumers who do not whether movies were reviewed or not could believe the cold-opened movies have average quality (because they don't know they were unreviewed) and would therefore go to those movies more often than if they made the correct strategic inference. 16 However, this explanation cannot explain the premium to cold opening because these uninformed moviegoers would overvalue all movies of below average quality, including those which were not opened cold, and would undervalue all movies of above average quality as well. Missing information about cold openings in this way simply means missing information about all critic reviews which biases the regression coefficient on quality toward zero, but does not create a differential effect for low-quality movies which were cold opened compared to those which were not.
Other explanations are more credible. It is possible that cold opened movies have some other characteristic omitted from the Table 2 regressions that causes these movies to generate apparently greater box office (a classic omitted variable bias). In this case, our regressions are not capturing the effect of cold opening, but are capturing the effect of an omitted variable that is correlated with cold opening. Since many controls effect (−3%, p ≈ 0.5; −10%, p < 0.1 (lean)) on post-opening-weekend revenue, and a opening weekend is correlated with post-opening-weekend revenue (120%, p < 0.01).
15 Theaters may be a proxy for the omitted variable of advertising budget as well, which magnifies its effect. 16 This example is very similar to having a moviegoers curse for all movies rather than just the cold opened ones. See section 4.2 for an explanation of the cursed equilibrium model and footnote 30 for more detail.
are included, the most likely omitted variable that could be correlated with the decision to cold open is spending on publicity and advertising. 17 Omitting this variable would explain the cold opening premium if revenues increase with spending on advertising, and if advance screening and advertising are substitutes (i.e., if distributors spend more on ads to compensate for cold opening). However, a senior executive at Fox distributors we interviewed contradicted this notion, suggesting that if anything distributors are tighter with their spending on advertising once the decision to cold-open is made (which happens late in the process, after the number of screens and most other variables have been determined). The executive's view was that distributors know cold-opened movies are not very good, and see high levels of ad spending on such movies as throwing good money after a bad movie. 18 Further, the industry appears to typically set advertising budgets as a fixed proportion of production budgets (Vogel (2007) suggests one-half, an executive at Village Roadshow told us two-thirds). If these rules of thumb are true, then the production budget variable will pick up much of the omitted effect of advertising, if there is any. 19 Another potential problem is that annoyed critics may give cold-opened movies lower critical ratings than they would have if the movies were screened in advance (perhaps as a way of punishing the distributors for making the movie unavailable). 20 This explanation seems unlikely since critics pride themselves on objectivity (for example, they rarely mention in late reviews of cold opened movies that the movie was unavailable in advance). Furthermore, the cold opening premium is evident even when imdb user ratings are used instead of metacritic quality ratings.
One way to test for an omitted-variable bias is to look at the log total box office of the U.K. and Mexico, and log of US video rental data. In these markets, the possible deception of cold opening should be less effective because movies are almost always released in the U.K. and Mexico after the initial U.S. release, and home video rentals are always later than U.S. box office releases. If information about the movie's quality is widely disseminated before these later releases, the cold opening effect should disappear in foreign and rental markets. Table 4 reports the cold-opening coefficients (from a regression including all variables as in Table 2 ).
There is apparently no cold opening premium in these two foreign markets and the rental markets, which works against the hypothesis that the premium is due to an omitted-variable bias and is consistent with the 17 Unfortunately, we found advertising budgets for only 445 of the 856 movies in our sample, and only 12 of the 59 cold openings. 18 A regression on log advertising budget suggests a cold opening is associated with a 10% drop in advertising budget. However, because the advertising data are incomplete, this result is only based on 12 cold openings and is not significant (p ≈ 0.3; lean regression p ≈ 0.23).
19 A regression of production budget on marketing budget, for the 445 movies that we have both types of budget data, has R 2 = 0.496, indicating advertising budgets are highly correlated with production budgets. 20 Litwak (1986) mentions this idea when describing a cold opening. Another way to check whether cold opened movies have any inherent differences in sensitivity to critic ratings is to examine the movies by genre. Comedies and suspense/horror movies account for 80% of cold openings, but only 54% of all movies (see Table 3 ). If fans of these genres have less sensitivity to bad reviews (suggested by Reinstein and Snyder, 2005) , and are more likely to go to a movie that has low critic ratings than fans of other genres, then the cold opening premium could be a result of the selection of cold-opened movies into these genres. 22 Table 3 shows that this is not the case. Throughout genres, moviegoers' correlation between critic reviews and self-reported reviews are all around 0.75. The cold open premium is positive for all genres (6-21%) except for the genre "animated" but that result is driven by a single movie, "Doogal." The cold opening premium is not genre-specific.
Finally, our hypothesis is that limited iterated strategic thinking causes some moviegoers to be "tricked,"
incorrectly overestimating the ex-ante quality of cold opened movies. Since moviegoers presumably go to these movies based on their perception of quality, among other factors, a greater number of cold opening moviegoers should have negative impressions of their movie. Then if user reviews are representative of the audience that views a film, we should find lower user reviews for cold-opened movies, holding everything else constant. Using imdb.com user data and the usual Table 1 independent variables, we find that cold opened movies have an average rating 0.4 points (out of 10) lower than non-cold opened movies. The result 21 Another explanation is that moviegoers of cold-opened movies are less sensitive to critic reviews. Then the high turnouts for cold-opened movies have nothing to do with the opening, but just the fact that given identically low critic reviews, cold-opened movies turn out more viewers. This explanation may appear appealing as the correlation of critic reviews and user reviews for cold-opened movies while high (0.51) is much lower than the correlation of critic reviews and user reviews of non-cold opened movies (0.76). However, this relationship likely results from the fact that cold-opened movies create a smaller range of critic ratings (x ≈ 25, s 2 ≈ 11). If we restrict non-cold opened movies to those with critic ratings under 40 (x ≈ 29, s 2 ≈ 8) or above 60 (x ≈ 70, s 2 ≈ 7), we find similar values for the correlation (0.51 and 0.53, respectively). 22 This explanation would not explain why distributors would be more likely withhold bad news in genres where the intended audience is the least receptive to bad news. is highly significant (p < 0.001).
In the next section we will develop three structural models of strategic thinking by moviegoers and distributors and estimate behavioral parameters which measure the degree of limited strategic thinking for both groups. If some of these models can successfully explain the cold opening premium with similar parameter values to what has been observed in other studies, that result is another piece of evidence that the premium is not due to an omitted variable, but instead reflects some limit on strategic thinking.
The General Model
In designing a model of movie viewing and distributor choice, the aim is to create a model that can be analyzed with box office data, but allows estimation of behavioral parameters of individual thinking. The model permits both distributors and moviegoers to be influenced by the choice of the other side. Recall, the initial regressions in Section 2 were not designed to measure the endogenous choice of distributors to cold open but these behavioral models are.
We assume that the distributor of movie j and moviegoers both know movie characteristics X j . The game form is simple: Distributors observe q j and then choose whether to open cold (c j = 1) or to screen for critics in advance (c j = 0). Moviegoers form a belief E m (q j |c j , X j ) about a movie that depends on its characteristics X j and whether it was cold opened c j . 23 Below we consider three models of belief formation.
One is a standard equilibrium concept and two incorporate forms of limited strategic thinking.
The first assumption is that if a movie is screened to critics, its quality is then known to moviegoers.
Quality could be known with noise and all results go through if moviegoers are risk-neutral:
To model moviegoing and distributor decisions jointly, we use a quantal response approach in which moviegoers and distributors choose stochastically according to either utilities or expected profits. Since we have no data on individual choices or demographic market-segment data, we use a representative-agent approach to model moviegoers. Assumption 2 is that moviegoer utility is linear in movie characteristics and expected quality, subtracting the ticket price.
where α and β give the corresponding predictive utility associated with expected quality and other known characteristics of movies. The opportunity utility of not going to the movies is defined as zero. 24 In the quantal response approach, probabilities of making choices depend on their relative utilities. We use a logit specification (e.g., McFadden, 1974) . The probability that the representative moviegoer will go to movie j with characteristics X j and expected quality E m (q j |c j , X j ), at ticket pricet 25 is
where λ m is the sensitivity of responses to utility. Higher values of λ m imply that the higher-utility choice is made more often. At λ m = 0, choices are random. 26 As λ m → ∞, the probability of choosing the option with the highest utility converges to one (best-response). 27
Expected box-office revenues are assumed to equal the probability of attendance by a representative moviegoer, times the population size N and ticket pricet, which is R(
Note that the distributor's choice of c j is assumed to enter the revenue equation solely through its effect on moviegoer expectations of quality E m (q j |c j , X j ).
The distributor's decision to screen the movie (c j = 0) or open it cold (c j = 1) is also modeled by a stochastic choice function based on a comparison of expected profits from the two decisions. Given assumption 1, the revenue from screening is R(X j , q j ) and the revenue from cold opening is R(X j , E m (q j |1, X j )).
Given the same logit choice specification as for moviegoers, the probability of a distributor opening the movie cold is therefore given by assumption 3,
where λ d is the sensitivity of distributor responses to expected revenue. 28
24 This is without loss of generality because a constant term is included in the revenue regression, which in this model is equivalent to the estimated utility of not going to the movie. 25 The termt is the average US ticket price in midyear 2003 (recall box office revenues are in 2003 dollars). For an explanation on why movie ticket prices do not differ by movies see Orbach and Einav (2007) or for a more general explanation, Barro and Romer (1987) . 26 This model implies that if λm = 0, the representative moviegoer will attend each movie in its first weekend with .5 probability. While that result may be unappealing, note that a multinomial specification (i.e, if λm = 0, the representative moviegoer will go to the movies with .5 probability and which movie he goes to will depend on its underlying characteristics) would be much more complicated to calculate and also has unappealing results. For instance, movies that open alone each weekend should have much higher box office than those that open with three other movies (generally not true). For these reasons and because it was the most apparent logit model, this model was chosen.
Additionally, this point is moot. The later λm estimates will be far from 0 (see Table A .4). As it turns out when one looks at equation 5, it is apparent that it would require on average movies to make roughly $800 million in their first weekend to pushλm to 0 (because that parameter value suggests half the US population sees the movie). Instead this value can be thought of as an upper bound on movie revenue and a lower bound on rationality.
27 See Luce and Raiffa (1957) , Chen et al. (1997) , McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) . 28 In many previous applications of these games to experimental datasets the response sensitivity parameters λ are the same since
The logic of the model and our data (see Section 2 and Table 2) suggest that cold opening most strongly affects the first weekend's revenue (which may then affect cumulative revenue). Therefore, we use the first weekend's revenue to calibrate the models' revenue equations and distributor decisions in the next section.
Our probability and utility functions given in assumption 2 and equation 2 are based on the moviegoers' behavior in the first weekend. 29
Models of Strategic Thinking
The Quantal response equilibrium combines the stochastic choice functions described above with the standard equilibrium assumption that agents' beliefs about the behavior of other agents are statistically correctin this case, moviegoers' beliefs reflect an understanding of the distributors' decisions, and vice versa. The "QR" part of QRE reflects the fact that players do not choose best economic responses all the time. The "E" part suggests their expectations about other players' behavior are still correct (i.e., they are still in equilibrium).
The cursed equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy approaches both allow limits on strategic thinking, which are parsimoniously parameterized by a single behavioral parameter.
In cursed equilibrium (Section 4.2), moviegoers' beliefs about the quality of a cold-opened movie are a weighted average of unconditional overall average quality (with weight χ) and the rationally-expected quality that fully anticipates distributors' decisions (with weight 1 − χ). 30 The parameter χ is a measure of the degree of naïveté in the moviegoers' strategic thinking (i.e., to what extent beliefs about cold-opened game payoffs are on similar payoff scales. We use two separate parameters here, λm and λ d , because the payoffs are on the order of dollar-scale utilities for moviegoers and millions of dollars for distributors. 29 Results are similar when total box office is used. 30 In some applications χ is more naturally interpreted as a fraction of people who are uninformed or not thinking strategically, which might be measured directly in surveys or methods to classify people into types. However, in our specific structural framework, box office revenues are not linear in expected beliefs (through assumption 2). So a model in which there are a fraction χ of people who use average quality for cold-opened movies, and a fraction 1−χ who form rational expectations is not exactly equivalent. (The difference is that between a nonlinear probability function of a weighted average and a weighted average of nonlinear probabilities.) movies are biased toward average unconditional quality).
In the cognitive hierarchy (CH) approach (Section 4.3), there is a hierarchy of levels of strategic thinking.
The lowest-level thinkers do not think strategically at all, and higher-level thinkers best-respond to correctly anticipated choices of lower-level thinkers. For parsimony, the frequencies of players at different levels in the cognitive hierarchy are characterized by a Poisson distribution with mean level parameter τ .
Importantly, both models allow full rationality as a limiting case of their behavioral parameters. Full rationality corresponds to χ = 0 in cursed equilibrium and τ → ∞ in CH. Therefore, estimates derived from the data will indicate the degree of moviegoer rationality.
Logistic Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) Model
In QRE, the moviegoers use Bayes' rule and rational expectations to infer the expected quality of movies that are cold-opened from the distributors' actual choice probabilities. That is, E qre m (q j |1, X j ), the QRE expectation of moviegoers about the quality of an unscreened movie with characteristics X j is
(laws of probability)
(independence assumption)
Intuitively, for agents to form an expectation about the quality of a cold opened movie E qre m (q j |1, X j ), they must consider all possible levels of quality that a movie could have (hence the summations over all integers in [0,100]), and the conditional probability that it would be of that quality given its characteristics and the fact that a distributor decided to cold open it with probability P (q|1, X j ) (which is equal to π(q|1, X j ) under QRE). Using laws of probability, and the crucial assumption that the probability of any movie's quality level, P (q), is independent from the probability of it having any other characteristics (P (X j )), 31 then a cold opened movie's expected quality, E qre m (q j |1, X j ), only depends on the joint probability of a distributor cold opening a movie with given characteristics and quality (π (X j , q)), and the frequency of quality ratings (P (q)). From this transformation we are able to calculate E qre m (q j |1, X j ) if π (X j , q) is known.
31 Appendix B, Table A .3 shows the intercorrelation matrix. There is only one variable which has a correlation with quality higher than .20-namely, the budget (r = .28). Therefore, the assumption of independence in (3) is not a bad approximation.
The cold opening probabilities π(X j , q) depend on estimated revenues from opening the movie cold or screening it (and revealing its quality, assuming (A1)). We use a transformation, then regression, to estimate the revenue as a function of X j and q. The revenue equation (defined in previous section) is
Rearranging terms and taking the logarithm, yields a specification which is easy to estimate because it is linear in characteristics X j and expected quality E m (q j |c j , X j ),
Note that the QRE is recursive: Moviegoers' beliefs about the quality of cold opened movies depend
on which movies the distributors choose to cold open (through equation 3). The distributors' choice to cold open depends on moviegoers' beliefs about the quality of cold opened movies (through assumption 3).
Because of this recursive structure, we estimate the model using an iterative procedure (see Appendix C for details). The procedure first uses the large number of screened movies (where quality is assumed to be known to moviegoers by (1)) to estimate regression parameters that forecast revenues conditional on quality in (5). Then specific expected qualities for all cold opened movies are imputed using a maximum-likelihood procedure that chooses a distributor response sensitivity λ d which explains actual decisions best and satisfies the moviegoer rational expectations property (3). These inferred expected qualities are then added to qualities of all movies to re-estimate (5) and the process iterates until parameters converge. Convergence means that parameters have been found such that both the representative moviegoer and the distributors best-respond (stochastically) and the moviegoer rational-expectations constraint on cold-opened movies (3) is satisfied. Table A .4 shows the regression results from six iterations from this process (which stopped according to the step 6 convergence definition in Appendix C). The r-squared value, 0.682, shows our model has a reasonable fit with the data. The final log likelihood value, −205.7 implies that the (geometric) mean correctly-predicted probability of actual decisions for all movies is 0.79, much better than chance guessing (0.5) and also a little better than simply guessing that all movies have a cold opening probability equal to the 7% (59/856) base rate (which yields a value of −211.62, mean correctly predicted probability 0.78).
Standard error estimates, determined by 100 bootstraps of this process, are shown in Table 8 and will be discussed in Section 4.4.
Cursed Equilibrium
Eyster and Rabin (2005) created a model of "cursed equilibrium" to explain stylized facts like the winner's curse in auctions, and other situations where some agents do not seem to infer the private information of other players from those players' actions. Their idea is that such an incomplete inference is consistent with agents not appreciating the degree to which other players' actions are conditioned on information.
In this context, for every cold opened movie, all moviegoers believe that the movie has quality equal to some weighted average of the true expected movie quality (given distributor decisions) and the average of all movies (ignoring any information conveyed by the cold opening decision). That is,
where E re m (q|X j , 1) reflects rational expectations about distributor decisions. We use an iterative procedure nearly identical to the one used above to find a best-fitting value of χ m . The difference in the procedure is that E ce m (q j |1) and χ m are used in forecasting revenue rather than E qre m (q j |1), and hence are also used in predicting distributor decisions.
If χ m = 0 this model is equivalent to QRE. The best-fitting value, based on first weekend cold box office data, is χ m = .922 however, which indicates a high degree of curse. That is, since the estimated correct expectation E re m (q|X j , 1) for cold opened movies is low (E m (q|1)= 25), and average overall quality is much higher (q = 48) the representative moviegoer is cursed in believing that quality of a cold opened movie is roughly 46 (=48 χ m + 25(1 − χ m )), much closer to the average quality of all movies than the actual average quality of cold-opened movies. Cursed moviegoers vastly overestimate the quality of movies that are opened cold.
Since box-office revenues are increasing in quality, the fact that cursed moviegoers overestimate the quality of cold opened movies is consistent with the box office premium found in the basic regressions in Section 2. Indeed, the best-fitting cursed parameter estimate given the expectations found in the previous model, ofχ m1 = .922, predicts an average log box office premium on weekend box office of 0.33 (an increase in revenue of 33%). This value is considerably higher than 15% estimate determined from our initial regression-i.e., it appears that the model implies too little rationality of moviegoers, compared to the revenue effect from regression (see Appendix B for more detail).
Eyster and Rabin applied their model to experimental data from Forsythe et al. (1989) on agents "blind bidding" for objects of unknown value, after the producers of the objects have decided whether to reveal their values. In their estimation, all values of χ ∈ (0, 1] fit better than the no-curse value χ = 0, and the best-fitting χ = .8. This number is similar to our estimate. Both estimates indicate high degrees of curse, with agents inferring quality of unknown goods at levels much greater than the fully correct expectation.
However, the previous analysis has ignored the distributor decision function-the result above only describes what best fits first weekend box office revenues. If cursed equilibrium requires the moviegoer curse parameter χ m to be the same as the distributor's estimate of the curse (as the model intends), then iterating the procedures leads to χ m = E d (χ m ) = 0, which is equivalent to the QRE restriction in which there is no curse. 32 The intuition is simple: Given an apparent curse of χ m = .922, distributors should be cold-opening a lot more movies of low quality than they actually are. Within the simple structure of this model, the only way to explain their anomalous behavior is that they do not believe moviegoers are as cursed as the box office revenue data suggest they are.
A Cognitive Hierarchy Model
Cognitive hierarchy or level-k models assume the population is composed of individuals that do different numbers of steps of iterative strategic thinking. The lowest level (0-level) thinkers behave heuristically (perhaps randomly) and k level thinkers optimize against k − 1 type thinkers. 33 Zero-level thinkers, such as moviegoers, do not think about the distributor's actions of cold opening a movie. For any cold-opened movie they infer the movie's quality E 0 m (q j |X j , 1) at random 34 by selecting any integer on [0,100] with equal probability. They will go to any movie with probability defined as an analogue of equation (2) 
(1/101) 1
32 That is, the maximum likelihood parameter for distributor's decisions is χ d = 0 (i.e., distributors act as if moviegoers have no curse). If we only try to fit first weekend box office revenue, we have χm = 0.922. If we must use the same value for both, the process will converge the same as QRE with χm = E d (χm) = 0.
33 This classification differs from some other versions of the cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004) which suggests k level thinkers optimizes against a distribution of 0,1,...k − 1 level thinkers. 34 In many games, assuming that 0-level players choose randomly across possible strategies is a natural starting point. However, the more general interpretation is that 0-level players are simple, or heuristic, rather than random. For example, in "hide-and-seek" games a natural starting point is to choose a "focal" strategy (see Crawford and Iriberri (2007a) ). In our game, random choice by moviegoers would mean random attendance at movies. That specification of 0-level play doesn't work well because it generates far too much box office revenue. Another candidate for 0-level moviegoer play is to assume a cold-opened movie has sample-mean qualityq. For technical reasons, that does not work well either. It is admittedly not ideal to have special ad hoc assumptions for different games. Eventually we hope there is some theory of 0-level play that maps the game structure and a concept of simplicity or heuristic behavior into 0-level specifications in a parsimonious way. 0, 100] . Similarly, a 0-level distributor will cold open movies at random, that is,
A 1-level moviegoer knows 0-level distributors cold open movies at random, and assumes all distributors behave in this manner. For each movie he calculates the expected quality given it has been cold opened as
A 1-level distributor expects all moviegoers to behave like 0-level moviegoers. They will assign quality ratings to cold-opened movies at random from the uniform U [0, 100] distribution. The 1-level distributor will therefore cold-open movie j with probability
Proceeding inductively, for any strategic level k, the values E k−1 m (q|1, X j ) and π k−1 (q j , X j ) are computed from response to k-1 level type beliefs and actions. The k-level distributor and moviegoer have probabilities and beliefs
and
which leads to moviegoing probability
where every level-k distributor and moviegoer is playing a quantal response to the level-k-1 moviegoer and distributor respectively. Table 5 : Expected quality of When a Stranger Calls (q = 27) given it is cold opened by level-k moviegoer and probability it is cold opened by level-k distributor in CH with QR model (λ d = 7.085).
As an example, Table 5 shows moviegoer-inferred quality and distributor probability of cold opening for the movie When a Stranger Calls, for various levels of thinking and their proportions within the population with λ d = 7.085 (a figure estimated from the data, see Table A .5).
Notice that a 0-level distributor cold opens movies at random. Thus a 1-level moviegoer, optimizing against such distributor, believes that cold opened movies have quality (48.12), the average quality of all movies (see equation 9). Then a 2-level distributor, knows that a 1-level moviegoer's belief in cold opened quality is much higher than actuality (q = 27). Since quality is preferred by moviegoers, such distributor is very likely to cold open the movie (he will only release it given a quantal response tremble, which depends on the other characteristics of the movie (X j )). The same can be said for for all level 1-5 distributors.
However if a moviegoer is level 5 or above, he believes a cold opened movie has lower quality than 27, thus distributors who optimize against such moviegoers (levels 6+) are unlikely to cold open a movie of quality 27.
The cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (2004) , based on lots of structurally different experimental games, suggests that the proportion of thinkers in the population is often well approximated by a one-parameter Poisson distribution with mean τ ,
where τ is the average number of steps of strategic thinking. 35
35 All Poisson distributions are determined by one parameter τ , which is both the mean and variance of the distribution. Thus τ is also the variance of the number of steps of strategic thinking.
Unlike the previously mentioned QRE and cursed models, the cognitive hierarchy model need not be an equilibrium model. That is, distributors do not need to be best responding to moviegoers beliefs or viceversa. For this reason we will define two separate τ parameters: τ m will be the mean number of moviegoer steps of strategic thinking, and τ d will be the mean number of distributor steps of strategic thinking. The result τ d = τ m = ∞ implies both are best responding to each other and we have a quantal response equilibrium.
To determine QR parameters {λ d , λ m } and additional CH parameters {τ d , τ m }, we use an iterative procedure for estimating values similar to the QRE procedure. The procedure is much easier, however, because level-k player behavior is determined by level-k-1 behavior. The iteration is a "do loop" for specific Note that the estimated value ofτ * m = 1.12 is lower, but is in the ballpark, 36 of estimates from experimental games (τ ≈ 1.5) 37 and for field data the initial week of Swedish LUPI lotteries (τ = 2.98,Östling et al., (2007) ) and managerial IT decisions (τ = 2.67, Goldfarb and Yang (2007) ). The parameter estimates imply an average cold opening box office premium of 35.7% (Table 6) , which, like the estimate for the cursed model, is positive but much higher than the regression estimate. Table 8 provides standard error estimates from 100 random bootstraps of the data set for each parameter and each model. These bootstrapped samples are then used to give standard error estimates for comparative statistics between the three models in Tables 6 and 7 . Among other things, Table 8 indicates the cognitive hierarchy model with quantal response fits distributor decisions (in terms of log likelihood) significantly better than the other models. 36 The objective function (sum of squared residuals) is rather flat in the vicinity of the best-fitting τm, so values from 2-4 give comparable fits toτ * m = 1.12. So an ex ante prediction based on τ = 1.5 from lab data would forecast reasonably well in this field setting.
Comparing Distributor Estimation across Models
37 Crawford and Iriberri (2007a, 2007b ) estimate a level-k model for auctions and hide-and-seek games respectively. They do not use a single Poisson parameter, but most of their classifications are for level 1 thinkers and level 2 second most, which would be most consistent with a Poisson parameter between 1-2. Table 6 : Comparison of the three models for moviegoer predictions with bootstrapped standard errors (N = 100). The last column is the square root of the average of the squared difference between actual box office (in millions $) and predicted box office (in millions $). Table 7 : Predictions of cold opening choices of distributors with bootstrapped standard errors (N = 100). Each model provides a probability that a given movie will be cold opened. When compared with actual data, there is a probability that the model would correctly predict all actual decisions correct (log likelihood), an expected number of cold opening decisions the movie would predict correctly (mean correct), and the standard deviation of the number that model would predict correctly. Table 8 : Parameter estimates of models with bootstrapped standard errors (N = 100). Note: χ* denotes result where moviegoers' curse and distributors' beliefs about moviegoers are the same.
Another thing to note is that most of the cursed model bootstraps have a best-fitting χ value of 0. Thus the initial finding of for equal moviegoer and distributor curse χ = 0 (equivalent to QRE) was not an aberration. However, standard errors indicate that for a few bootstrapped estimates, the best fitting χ was not zero. For χ m the estimates indicate a high degree of curse with some variation. Table 6 compares best-fitting parameter values in sums of squared residuals (for moviegoer decisions).
The non-equilibrium cursed model predicts the box office revenues of cold opened movies best in terms of deviations from actual data; the cognitive hierarchy model fits second best. This is not surprising since both models predict a box office premium. Even a prediction that moviegoers assume uniformly random quality to cold opened movies (all 0-level thinkers) fits the data better than the QRE model, which assumes correct expectations for cold opened quality.
For distributor decisions (Table 8 ) the best fitting equilibrium cursed parameter is zero, so the cursed and QRE models perform identically (because with χ*= 0, the models are equivalent). In cursed models, moviegoers and distributors are allowed to have non-Nash expectations, but distributors are required to best respond to them. The results suggest that given distributors must best respond to any degree of moviegoer curse, a model with moviegoers having correct expectations of movie quality fits the data best (that is, no expected moviegoer curse would explain the data better).
The CH model improves on the predictions of the other two models. The key to its relative success is that the model estimates a low τ for moviegoers (τ m = 1.12, close to experimental estimates of τ around 1.5-2.5) but the distributor τ d is much higher (8.5). These parameters express the intuition that some moviegoers are easily fooled-they think cold openings are close to random-but distributors do not think moviegoers are so easily fooled, which is the models way of explaining why so few movies are cold-opened. The CH model also predicts the most number of opening decisions correctly because its high τ d predicts very few movies will be cold opened but the higher λ d predicts some movies will be cold opened because of noise. The bootstrapped standard errors show these results are reasonably robust and do not depend on only a few data points. Importantly, the bootstrapped standard error around the mean bootstrapped estimate τ m = 1.120 is 0.121. This estimated τ for moviegoers is less than the average steps of thinking value found in most experiments (1.5), but is not much less. The estimate is also significantly different than random perception of quality (τ d = 0) or fully rational perception (τ d → ∞). The large improvement in log likelihood compared to the QRE and cursed models also suggests the CH model is a more reasonable overall explanation. All models are also an improvement over the baseline case which predicts that all movies to be cold-opened with the same probability (.07).
Conclusion
In games where information about product quality is known to be good or bad news, and may be strategically disclosed or withheld at no cost, the only equilibrium involves the information receiver believing all withheld information conveys the worst possible news. Then the information sender should always reveal all information (except the worst).
However, this equilibrium requires many steps of iterated strategic thinking. Numerous laboratory experiments have shown in a variety of games that either noisy responses or a small number of steps of strategic thinking tends to explain data well, as parameterized by quantal response equilibrium (QRE), cursed equilibrium, and cognitive hierarchy (CH) approaches. These models explain both experimental results that are far from equilibrium and other results that are surprisingly close to equilibrium, even in one-shot games (e.g., Goeree and Holt, 2001; Camerer et al., 2004 ). This paper is the first to apply all three parametrized models to a naturally occurring field phenomenon, an example of "structural behavioral economics." Field applications like these are important in showing whether principles of limited rationality that were inspired and calibrated by experimental data can also explain some basic facts in larger-scale field settings (see DellaVigna, 2007 , for many examples).
We study a market in which information senders (movie distributors) are strategically withholding information (the quality of their movie) from information receivers (moviegoers), by not showing movies to critics in time for reviews to be published before opening weekends. Contrary to the simple Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, there is a "box office premium"-movies that have been cold opened earn more than other pre-screened movies with similar characteristics. Importantly, there is no such premium in foreign or video rental markets, where movies are released after the initial US release (so that reviews are widely available).
The disappearance of the premium in rental and overseas markets is consistent with the hypothesis that the premium is due to some moviegoers failing to realize that no advance review is a bad signal about quality. The fact that moviegoer ratings (from imdb) are lower for these movies also suggests moviegoers' overestimated expected quality.
The QRE and cursed equilibrium models have difficulty explaining the box office premium. Both models perform poorly because moviegoers should correctly anticipate that cold opened movies are of low quality, which is inconsistent with the cold opening box office premium. The CH model with a low number of think- (Figure 3) . 39 The models in this paper suggest that distributors should have cold opened more movies as a best-response to limited strategic thinking by moviegoers. However, this speculation is severely limited by the fact that over the time period we study there are substantial changes in movie economics and information about movie quality (which leaks out in advance more nowadays due to internet sites and blogs).
Since this setting features producers choosing how much information about a dimension of product quality that consumers value to disclose, it is similar to many other industries that feature selective disclosure.
In relation to this literature, our results suggest that some consumers do not perfectly infer low quality from 38 A natural question is how fast consumers will eventually learn that cold opened movies have low quality. Economic intuition and experiments on lemons (e.g. Lynch et al., 2001 ) suggest consumers will ultimately infer that goods whose quality is not disclosed have low quality. However, movie audiences contain overlapping generations, so that the relevant time frame for learning is the first few years in which teenagers go to the movies. In this time they may only learn, with noise, from a few movies that they hear little about and are disappointed by. So it is conceivable that there is a learning process but it is slow enough within a generation, and does not spill over across generations, to permit the box office premium that we see in the data. non-disclosure (i.e., from cold opening). Furthermore, the fact that IMBD ratings are about 10% lower for movies that are cold opened suggests that consumers make mistakes which they regret. However, these mistakes are small (based on the rating measures) and distributors do disclose information (through reviews) about more than 90% of the movies, so this is a market in which voluntary disclosure is certainly working reasonably well.
Our results are similar to three other sharp field studies of consumer quality disclosure (Mathios, 2000; Jin and Leslie, 2003; Jin, 2005) . All three studies are inconsistent with the strong hypothesis that customer strategic thinking leads to complete voluntary disclosure, so that mandatory disclosure will have no effect.
Mathios (2000) studied nutrition labeling of salad dressing. Most low-fat dressings (less than 9 grams of fat per serving) were voluntarily labelled for fat content before mandatory disclosure, while only 15% of high-fat dressings were labelled. After mandatory disclosure, the share of the high-fat dressings fell by about 20%. This effect is consistent with the hypothesis that some consumers did not infer that non-labeling implied high fat content, and the mandatory disclosure provided information they had not inferred (but cared about). Jin and Leslie (2003) studied the effects of a shift from voluntary to mandatory posting of standardized health-rating cards in Los Angeles restaurants. They find that mandatory disclosure increases hygiene scores by 5.3%, which is about half a standard deviation of the distribution, and which is modestly significantly higher than under voluntary disclosure. 40 Jin (2005) shows that HMOs do not voluntarily disclose quality (via NCQA accreditation) in markets that are the least competitive. She also finds that HMOs which voluntarily disclose tend to serve areas with large employers, which suggests that HMOs are responding differently when they have more sophisticated customers (because big firms tend to have more savvy benefits managers) than when they have less sophisticated consumers.
Our paper was not designed to pass judgment on the detailed concerns in regulatory debates about disclosure. We simply note that the limits that we infer from consumer (moviegoer) behavior on strategic thinking are comparable to conclusions from the other empirical studies that are more sharply focussed on effects of disclosure changes or choices.
Finally, we note again that there are many markets and political situations with asymmetric information in which the failure to sometimes reveal information that could be revealed should be informative, if the receiver makes the proper strategic inference. Our approach and some of its technical details could be applied to these situations.
A Description of Variables
To determine if a movie was cold opened (c j = 1) we examined the dates on three or four major news publications (the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, and New York Post). If the dates of reviews in any of these publications were later than the release date we examined the reasoning behind the late reviews. A movie was classified a "cold open" if at least one source stated the movie was not screened for critics before release (in most cases, none of the available sources had advance reviews).
Weekend and total US box office data were obtained from a FilmSource database (Nielsen EDI, www.
filmsource.com). The FilmSource database also included the number of theaters that showed a movie during its first weekend, the number of days in the opening weekend, and if the movie was released before Friday (generally only for anticipated blockbusters). FilmSource also gave a description of the genre of the movie, its MPAA rating (G, PG, PG-13, R), and whether the movie was adapted from previous source material.
Production budget information came from imdb.com for most movies, and from boxofficemojo.com or the-numbers.com for those missing from imdb.com. Budget data were available for 856 of the 890 movies, including 59 or the 62 cold openings (95%). Of this set, 832 movies also had the first day's box office data available on imdb.com including 59 of the 62 cold openings.
The imdb.com database was used to determine the star power rating of each movie's stars. Each week imdb.com determined this value by ranking the number of searches done on the imdb.com site for every person affiliated with movies. The most searched star would have value 1. Since there are over one million stars on imdb.com, we took the natural logarithm of the star ranking to reduce effect of unknown stars with very high numbers. We averaged the logged star ranking for the top two stars for each movie during its opening week.
Three other variables, competition (the average production budget of other movies released on the same opening weekend), the summer dummy variable (whether the movie was released in June, July and August), Table A .1 shows the regressions done on logged opening day box office in the full and lean regressions. Table   A .2 shows regressions done on logged post-opening-weekend box office in the full and lean regressions 41 The regressions had similar results when dummy variables for year were used instead of one year variable. 
C Details of Iterative Estimation Procedures (QRE, Cursed, CH)
This section provides the general iterative procedure for obtaining estimates for the relevant parameters of the QRE, cursed and CH models.
1. The iteration counter begins at i = 1.
2. The coefficients in equation 5 are estimated using a linear regression,
assuming N = 300 × 10 6 andt = 5.34. 42 In iteration i = 1 only the 797 movies which are screened to critics (c j = 0) are used. Using assumption 1, the observed q j is substituted for the unobserved expectation E m (q j |0, X j ) for these movies. Then all the independent and dependent variables are measured and we can estimate the regression easily. 43 In later iterations, expected quality
after iteration i will have been computed, and a regression on the full sample can be run.
Since simply usingR(X
to estimate R(X j , E m (q j |c j , X j ) would produce biased estimates, non-parametric kernel regression techniques are used. A consistent Gaussian kernel regression is used to estimate revenue from the parameter estimates from equation 15.
where g(j) = − λ m αE m (q j |c j , X j ) +βX j −t , and K is the Gaussian kernel,
with bandwidth, h = 0.9w J i −1/5 where w = min(s y , IQR y /1.34) (from Silverman, 1986 ) and J i is the current iteration's set of movies (with length 797 for iteration 1, 856 thereafter).
4. The regression results from step 2 give iteration-i coefficientsα i andβ i and a response sensitivitŷ λ m,i .
Step 3 gives estimated revenue equationR i from these parameters for different values of X j 42 Results are highly similar for N = 100 × 10 6 , 200 × 10 6 , andt = 5.34. 43 A crucial maintained assumption below is that the coefficient on expected quality, α, in determining moviegoer attendance, and hence revenue, is the same for known-quality (screened) and unknown-quality (cold opened) movies. and q j . From equation (3) we have E qre m (q j |X j , 1) = P 100 q=0 qπ(X j ,q)P (q) P 100 q=0 π(X j ,q)P (q) ⇒ E qre m (q j |X j , 1) 100 q=0 π (X j , q) P (q) = 100 q=0 qπ (X j , q) P (q) ⇒ where the last step follows from the definition of π(X j , q) (assumption 3). All the terms in 17 can be estimated from regression coefficients (α i ,β i ,λ m,i from step 2), determined from the revenue equationR i (from step 3), fit from the quality distribution P (q), or fixed by assumption (t, N), except for λ d and E qre m i (q j |X j , 1). To create an iteration of estimates of E qre m (q j |X j , 1) ∀j we fix a value of λ d and solve 17 for each movie j. Next, using fixed λ d , and newly calculated estimates of E qre m i (q j |X j , 1) for each movie, along with the estimated parameters in step 2 and revenue equations in step 3, the predicted iteration-i probability (π i (X j , q j , λ d )) that each movie j will be cold opened can be computed from assumption 3.
Additionally, in the cursed procedure: For any fixed χ d , the newly calculated estimates of E qre m (q j |X j , 1) (see above equation 17) for each movie can be converted to E ce m (q j |X j , 1), by equation 6. With those values, along with the estimated parameters in step 2 and revenue equations in step 3, the predicted iteration-i probability (π i (X j , q j , λ d ) that each movie j will be cold opened can be computed from assumption 3 for each value of χ d .
The CH procedure obtains the probabilities that each movie is cold opened differently:
For a given λ d and τ d , we use our estimated valuesα i ,β i ,λ m,i , and estimated revenue equation R i to estimate π ki (q j , X j ), E ki (q|X j , 1), andR i (E k (q|X j , 1)) for k = 0 . . .k using equations 9-12. 44 Since the probability of a given distributor being level k is P (x = n| d ) = τ n d e −τ /n! and the probability of that distributor cold opening given he is level k is π k (q j , X j ), the total probability that a movie is cold opened isπ
5.
Step 4 is performed repeatedly for a grid search over sets of values of λ d ∈ A i (or (λ d , χ d ) ∈ {A i , B}, 44 We usedk = 40, because given regular τ values the probability of k > 40 is nearly zero. 
where L(ω) is the joint probability that distributors would choose to screen and cold open each of the 856 movies in the exact manner they did under the QRE (or cursed, CH) model with parameter(s) ω. 47
6. The value for the maximum likelihood parameter λ * d,i determined from the last step 5 is then used in equation 17 to solve for iteration-i values of E qre m i (q j |c j , X j ) for each of the 59 cold opened movies.
For the CH procedure: The maximum likelihood value λ * d,i is used to compute the populationaveraged expectation for each of the 59 cold opened movies in the sample with E[E k (q|X j , 1)|τ m ] =m k=0 π k (q j , X j )E k (q|X j , 1).
The value of τ m that minimizes the squared residuals in equation 5 is considered the best estimator for this step, that is τ * m,i = argmin
whereR i (...) is estimated from the kernel estimation 15 in step 2.
Now we have a full set of quality measures q j and expected qualities for every movie. 46 In the early steps of iteration (i.e., steps 1-3) this value is determined by interpolating inside the grid to achieve more decimal precision. 47 This process takes roughly 15 minutes (8 minutes for CH) for each λ d on a single PC running Mathematica 5.2.
7. The process is stopped when the regression values and parameter estimates (λ * m , ω * m ) from the current iteration i are all within .001 of those from iteration i − 1. Otherwise, the process is repeated with the iteration counter increased by one, starting with the regression step 2. For the cursed procedure: 
whereR(...) is the last estimate done in step 3.
8. The process is repeated 100 more times with different bootstrapped data sets. A bootstrapped data set is created by randomly sampling with replacement from the 856 movies in the original data set.
Parameter estimates are obtained by repeating steps 1-7. Standard errors (see Table 8 ) are calculated by taking the standard deviation of these 100 parameter estimates. 48 48 Depending on the bootstrap and number of iterations, the process for a single bootstrap takes 2-6 hours for QRE (2-6 for cursed, 2-12 for CH) on a single PC running Mathematica 5.2
